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‘Memory Must Be Defended’: Beyond the Politics of Mnemonical Security 
	
Abstract. This article supplements and extends the ontological security theory in International 
Relations (IR) by conceptualizing the notion of mnemonical security. It engages critically the 
securitization of memory as a means of making certain historical remembrances secure by 
delegitimizing or outright criminalizing others. The securitization of historical memory by 
means of law tends but to reproduce a sense of insecurity among its contesters. To move beyond 
the politics of mnemonical security, two lines of action are outlined in the paper: (i) the 
desecuritization of social remembrance in order to allow for its repoliticization, and (ii) the 
rethinking of the Self-Other relationship in mnemonic conflicts. A radically democratic, 
agonistic memory politics is called for that would cease from the knee-jerk treatment of the 
issues of identity, memory and history as problems of security. Rather than trying to secure the 
insecurable, a genuinely agonistic mnemonic pluralism would enable to question different 
interpretations of the past, instead of pre-defining national or regional positions on legitimate 
remembrance in ontological security terms. 
 
Introduction 
Just like families should have the right to complete their own photo albums, such a 
right should also be reserved for states and nations. Otherwise we would be asked to 
undress ourselves completely, so that our identity could be utterly destroyed. ...attacks 
on the identity [are] targeted in the first place [at] ...the most important part of our 
identity – its core part. The core part is made of our inheritance. Of what we are and 
what is our inherent being like. That is precisely why all states, nations and people 
hold dear the story of their origins and inception...We should not deceive ourselves 
that our perseverance could be guaranteed exclusively with the sword of truth 
(Aaviksoo, 2011). 
 
Also sprach the Estonian Minister of Defence Jaak Aaviksoo at a high-profile government-
organized conference on information warfare and psychological defence which took place in 
the context of Russia´s recently intensified action towards its former Soviet dependants on 
undermining their international image and credibility inter alia via attempts to delegitimize 
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their respective accounts of the Second World War (WWII). If one ever needed a clearer 
declaration of the ontological security argument, as well as an exposition of its inherent ethical 
conundrums, here is one. It demonstrates the spread of security outside of its traditional realm 
of physical survival. It establishes the inevitable connection between state identity and security, 
underscoring the role of ´national memory´ in state´s biographical self-narrative. It exposes a 
quintessentially modern political imaginary where the supremacy of sovereign states is an 
unquestionable fact around the security of which all political life should circulate. It puts forth 
an assumption about the irrefutable interchangeability of the national mythscape and 
memoryscape (cf. Bell, 2003, 2008). Invoking ´state´s right for informational self-
determination´, it makes the case for the right of a nation-state as a self-conscious entity to 
secure its persistence as itself by secrets, lies, silences and disguises, if necessary. It demarcates 
the limits of the inside of a state from the outside world by naturalizing the policing of the 
borders of the self from the perils of the other (cf. Walker, 1993), highlighting the 
´compactness´ of identity (cf. Aaviksoo, 2009) as a vital necessity for states and nations to 
survive in the age of ´information warfare´. In short, it ontologizes security, turning it thus an 
inescapable condition of international politics. 
Besides raising major ontological and epistemological questions about determining the 
limits of a collective 'self', anthropomorphizing the state and its collective 'memory', we are 
presented with a vision of the world where war serves as a key for understanding politics. 'Our 
memory must be defended' emerges as a variation of the omnipresent security-discourse, as yet 
another ringtone of the familiar 'society must be defended'-logic (see Foucault, 2003). Pursuing 
the security of the biographical self-narrative of the state (Berenskoetter, 2014) (of which 
mnemonical narratives occupy a central place)1 as part of the state´s security policy invites us 
																																								 																				
1	Cf. the concepts of ontological narratives (which are used to define who we are, which, in turn, can be a 
precondition on knowing what to do) and public narratives (Somers, 1994:618-619).	
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to ponder on the ethical implications of framing historical remembrance as a security issue. In 
particular, striving to fixate on certain collective memories (cf. Steele, 2008: 55) by juridifying 
the frames of legitimate social remembrance raises a host of thorny questions about the 
attempted delimitation, or even a closure, of a political discussion on various violent and 
controversial historical events.  
This article dissects the concept of mnemonical security – the idea that distinct 
understandings of the past should be fixed in public remembrance and consciousness in order 
to buttress an actor´s stable sense of self as the basis of its political agency– against the backdrop 
of a rapidly expanding research programme on ontological security in IR (Giddens, 1991; 
Kinnvall, 2004; Steele, 2005, 2008; Mitzen, 2006a, b; Krolikowski, 2008; Roe, 2008; Zarakol, 
2010; Lupovici, 2012; Croft, 2012; Kay, 2012; Rumelili, 2013). It inquires the possibilities to 
think about identity formation outside of security framework in order to move beyond the 
politics of mnemonical security. While deliberately normative in scope, it briefly discusses a 
number of examples from the actual processes of securitization in the transnational 
mnemopolitics of contemporary Europe in order to undergird the suggested normative moves 
also in social analysis. Due to the limitations of space, they remain illustrative vignettes, rather 
than amount to proper case studies. 
The core argument of this paper is that the securitization of ´memory´ as the temporal 
core of a state's biographical narrative leads eventually to new security dilemmas and therefore 
to a lesser sense of security among the competitive securitizers of issues of public remembrance 
in international politics. The securitization of historical 'memory' whereby 'our' narrative of the 
past is seen as viciously misunderstood and misrepresented by other(s), whose vision of the 
past is thus regarded as existentially endangering for our being as 'us', tends to reproduce the 
mutual insecurities and reinstate historical animosities instead of alleviating them (Mälksoo, 
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2012). Moreover, the ontologization of the state´s need to seek and sustain the intactness and 
consistency of its identity could dangerously depoliticize the act of protecting a biographical 
narrative of the state. Possible strategic calculations behind the ´ontological´ security 
movements could thus be easily overlooked and the exercise of power by mnemopolitical 
entrepreneurs engaged in the process disregarded. Legislation of memory on the assumption 
that collective memory and, by extension, ontological security, can be cemented by law, in fact 
depoliticizes it. Setting legal frames on how ´our story´ can be remembered is in a sense the 
ultimate securitization, because it ´ontologizes´ a particular story, making it an unchanging part 
of the state´s self-definition. It thus enables to solidify the power of the ruling regime, 
encouraging state-bound remembrance practices, thereby constituting the political community 
in a particular way. Seeking to outlaw struggles over possible narrations thus rejects the 
fundamentally political nature of state identity, thereby potentially curbing certain political and 
societal activity defined as undermining and endangering for this identity.  
 
Accordingly, I posit that 'memory' as a referent object of security needs to be 
desecuritized, but not depoliticized (in the sense of Edkins, 1999) whereby issues would remain 
constrained within the already accepted criteria of a specific social form (such as the 
constitution of a state´s self-identity against ´security threats´) and dealt with by a technology 
of expertise or the rule of bureaucracy. Rather, we should take notice of the political nature of 
collective memory as a frame of reference which implicates and produces subjectivity broadly 
conceived (Edkins, 1999: 1). While memories serve as ´temporal orientation devices that make 
past meaningful by providing a sense of where “we” have come from and what “we” have been 
through´ (Berenskoetter, 2014: 270), it is important to be attentive to the power games in the 
sanctioning and institutionalization of particular memories and thus unsettle the narrow, state-
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centric view of the ´subject´ of politics. The deconstruction of the ontological security claims 
of the states sheds light on the narrative nature of states as social beings (Ringmar, 1996; 
Epstein, 2011), thereby making possible imagining different, less fixed and more pluralistic 
mnemonical narratives for their ´ national´ biographies. Historical remembrance as a securitized 
issue should be brought back to the realm of political engagement and debate. Instead of 
silencing or depoliticization (which the narrow understanding of politics as public policy, 
requiring government decisions and resource allocations, essentially amounts to), 
repoliticization is necessary for generating emphatic understanding and less mnemonical 
confrontation between nations and communities (cf. Edkins, 1999:11). 
The article proceeds in four moves. The first section outlines the ontological security 
argument as it has been unfolded in IR, with an emphasis on the mnemonical dimension of 
ontological security. The problematic case of the securitization of memory is conceptualized 
and illuminated next against the backdrop of contemporary Eastern Europe where competitive 
claims are being made on securing 'national memories' from Russia to Poland, Ukraine, and 
beyond, ranging from mere discursive securitization to the proposal and adoption of pertinent 
legislations on the meaning of the Second World War (WWII) and the communist experience 
at the domestic, pan-European, and wider international level. The third section then pursues to 
explore the possibilities to dismantle the 'memory room' in the house of ontological security via 
strategies of desecuritization and repoliticization. The paper concludes with a discussion of 
agonistic pluralism as an alternative political imaginary to mnemonical security. 
 
Mnemonical Security as Ontological Security 
 
The conventional story of security is well known, at least so we think (Barkawi, 2011). As a 
concept, security has been expanded from demarcating the need for physical survival as a 
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prerequisite for states in order for them to physically maintain themselves to capturing multiple 
social actors' need for ontological consistency as an imperative for the sustainability of their 
identities, thereby enabling their political agency. Ontological security theory as advanced in 
IR in various ways (cf. McSweeney, 1999; Huysmans, 1998; Kinnvall, 2004; Mitzen, 2006a; 
Steele, 2008) argues security-as-being (as distinct from security-as-survival) to be an 
ontological self-identity need, or an ontologically inherent condition rather than a culturally 
circumscribed and constructed social good. Ontological security is accordingly a basic premise 
for constituting a self (Rumelili, 2013). It emerges as a logical derivative of the different 
constitutive conditions of a state. Hence, the distinction between security-as-survival and 
security-as-being reflects the distinctive, yet equally vital, features of a state – that is, the 
security of its 'body' (e.g., territory, people, sovereign institutions) and 'idea' (i.e. the 
biographical self-narrative of a state, including its historical memory, and the recognition of 
other states to its being as such). Consequently, the realm of dangers also embraces both 
physical and normative threats, whilst the endurance of actors' particularistic forms of existence 
are valued equally to their physical existence itself (Creppell, 2011: 455). The notion of 
'normative threat' draws attention to normative violation as a specific kind of transgression 
(besides physical violation) which 'elicits a sensation of harm not because there is no order 
(chaos) beyond one's border, but because of an alternative order' (Creppell, 2011: 471). It 
appears, then, that both security-as-survival and security-as-being are driven and ordered by the 
'ethos of survival' (Odysseos, 2002: 413) as the survival of a physical body is not sufficient 
without the survival of a combination of ideational features of a state, the intactness of which 
is equalled to its physical endurance. Survival thus still emerges as an overriding imperative of 
both modes of security (cf. Rumelili, 2013). Therefore, even though debating the narrowly 
materialist and rationalist accounts of security studies traditionally conceived, the concept of 
ontological security nonetheless sustains the idea of security being the greatest social value, the 
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highest objective of any social action, indeed the universal good. Ontological security reaffirms 
the categorical preeminence of survival as the ontological drive to protect oneself and surpass 
the other, if necessary (see Odysseos, 2002: 414). Accordingly, each state also wishes to secure 
its being as a certain sort of being; to guarantee its cohesiveness in order to reduce the 
fundamental unpredictability of the surrounding environment and its own vulnerability vis-à-
vis other political actors.2 
Remembering in a particular way is instrumental in order to sustain a coherent and 
consistent ´biographical narrative´ of a state: 
[I]t creates the 'person' of the state. Without narrative, without a state agent collecting the history of a 
nation-state into a story that informs current actions, the Self of a state does not exist. /--/ conceptually, the 
'idea' of the state cannot exist without this narration to develop a sense of continuity (Steele, 2008: 20; see 
also Berenskoetter, 2014). 
 
Memory hence emerges as a vital self-identity need as it is invoked to constitute state's 
central narrative about its past in order to form a core part of its consistent sense of the self in 
present. The intactness of a collective actor's mnemonic vision of itself and its place in the world 
thus becomes apparent as a prerequisite for an internally cohesive self. Deconstructing the 
central historical backbone of the self could seriously disrupt and destabilize the respective 
identity and hamper its agency as an actor in international affairs. Yet, it is imperative to ask 
whose history, memory, identity, and security we are really talking about in each particular 
case; to distinguish between the modalities of public, social, and political remembrance for the 
tendency of states to 'homogenize' their national identity at the expense of certain 'strangers' is 
always there (Huysmans, 1998). The successful endorsement of a state's story of origin hardly 
emerges without the exercise of power over what to remember and how. What counts as 
																																								 																				
2	Cf. the Copenhagen School's notion of 'societal security', defined as ´the ability of a society to persist in its 
essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats…the sustainability, within acceptable 
conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture, association, and religious and national identity 
and custom´ (Wæver, 1993: 23).	
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legitimate selections over completing one's own 'family album' for some, reads as wilful 
exclusions and untruthful enforcements for others. The way we conceptualize 
collective/social/public 'memory' of a state and the processes of 'remembering' collectively is 
of key significance in delineating the nature of the political community in question, as well as 
the nature of ontological security of this community. Pondering on the ethical implications of 
engaging the argument of historical memory in discourses and practices of security policy is 
therefore a must. 
More problematically, the social framing of issues of historical remembrance as 
ontological security problems and the related lax use of military metaphors (such as 
´information warfare´ and ´information threats´) conditions and legitimates the rhetoric and 
means of security for handling them, thereby enhancing the potential of militarizing a state´s 
historical self-understanding and culture as a whole. This is precarious not only for the tendency 
of this action to inevitably produce a tangling web of new security dilemmas, such as identity-
based security demands possibly conflicting with the physical security needs (Mitzen, 2006a), 
or situations of ontological dissonance in which states' multiple distinct identities are 
simultaneously threatened, forcing the state to choose between them (Lupovici, 2012). The 
securitization of 'national remembrance' also tends to replay the classical security dilemma as 
one state's memory of a same historical event is not necessarily others', and the increase of a 
sense of ontological security of one state at securing its 'memory' often comes at the expense of 
its neighbours' sense of ontological security concurrently. Another historical narrative might 
thus come to be perceived as a threat to self's ontological security, and a so-called 'information 
warfare' necessitating ´psychological defence´ (as also described by Aaviksoo in the opening 
caption of this paper) might ensue (Steele, 2008: 2-3). The Baltic-Russian ´memory wars´ on 
the interpretation of the course and consequences of WWII (Muižnieks, 2011) and the 
Ukrainian-Russian-Polish controversies on the institutionalized remembrance of historical 
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figures, such as Stepan Bandera (Zhurzhenko, 2013) are instructive here. The indefatigability 
of these mnemonic conflicts despite vigorous attempts to solve them for good by various 
mnemopolitical measures demonstrates how ontological security seeking via securitizing one's 
'memory' rather reduces the relative sense of security for the participants of a particular spat 
over remembering the past as it tends to amplify negative spirals of ontological insecurity 
instead. Moreover, it also seriously curbs the self-reflexivity of the political subject, be it a 
nation, or a state, about its own past and its role in the present self-understanding and self-
representation in the international arena. While the disruption of the automatized 'memory-
nation nexus' (Olick, 2003: 5-6), or the national identity equals memory-connection (cf. Bell, 
2009) enables a state to better interrogate its sense of self, the securitization of historical 
memory by means of law rather brings about the risk of getting stuck in old and 
counterproductive roles in international politics (see Mitzen, 2006a, b; Hopf, 2010). Since 'an 
honest remembrance of the past can challenge the integrity of the narrative of state identity' 
(Zarakol, 2010: 7), seeking to deduce state's ontological security from an embellished 
mythscape instead of a fair and self-critical poking of the memories of the past remains 
dangerously alluring (cf. Bell, 2008). 
Hence, while mnemonical security captures crucial elements of the identity-security 
nexus, as a notion, it also illustrates the dangers of allowing the metaphoric arsenal of security 
and war to travel untamed over all other fields of analysis of international political phenomena. 
To be sure, the assumption of the possibility of ultimate security of a state identity and 
consequently of its 'national memory´ is more commonly shared among the security 
practitioners than much of the ontological security literature. Rumelili (2013), Steele (2008) 
and Mitzen (2006a) prominently acknowledge that seeking ontological security by rigid 
attachment to a monolithic identity narrative, or the securitization of identity, is only one 
possibility of achieving basic trust, and a dangerous one at that. Phillip Darby (2006: 465) has 
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nonetheless pointed out that what is missing in most of the writings on security 'is not only that 
the acceptance of some insecurity is a condition of security itself, but that insecurity can be 
enabling as well as disabling'. Likewise, Maja Zehfuss (2003) has underscored the inescapable 
insecurity at the heart of identity, emphasizing how foreignness can never be entirely removed 
from identity and needs thus to be recognized in order to transform the relation to the other.  
Considering, then, that the attempts to achieve absolute sovereignty over a particular 
interpretation of the past are bound to come into conflict with competing and contradictory 
narratives of the same event, would we not be better off to start from the realization that no 
matter how pervasive, mnemonical insecurities (as any insecurities for that matter) can never 
be utterly overcome and done away with?  
This is not to suggest here that ontological (and by implication mnemonical) insecurity 
should therefore be a preferable ´good´ instead of the commonly sought ontological security. 
Rather, as ontological anxiety is, to an extent, quite simply inevitable, it would be wiser to 
acknowledge and come to terms with it, instead of entertaining a pipe dream of a perfectly 
´securable´ identity and its beholder´s historical memory. The unfinalizability of any identity 
should be recognized for its perpetual ´becoming´ on the boundaries of identity and difference 
in its enduring dialogues with others (Mälksoo, 2010). The perils of collapsing ontological 
security and the securitization of identity should thus be recognized whenever 'historical 
memory' is summoned in discourses and practices of security policy. 
 
The Securitization of Memory  
I suggest that especially via the tendency to reach for law as the mnemonic technology we are 
witnessing the attempted securitization of ´historical memory´ in international politics. 
Securitization, as we know from the burgeoning work of and on the Copenhagen School, is a 
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discursive process through which certain issues or entities are turned into a threat (Wæver, 
1995; Buzan et al., 1998; for a more sociological alternative, see Balzacq, 2011). A successful 
securitization  includes ´the designation of an existential threat requiring emergency action or 
special measures and the acceptance of that designation by a significant audience´ (Buzan et 
al., 1998: 27). Presenting a particular way of relating to the past as instrumental for the stability 
and continuity of a national biographical narrative (that is, the state´s self-proclaimed 
ontological security) could in utmost emergency mode mean that the state could legitimate the 
use of force and violence for protecting its 'memory' (Buzan et al., 1998: 21).3  
Endeavours to protect certain ways of relating to the past by outlawing others aim at 
securing particular identities, often in order to overcome a political community's metaphorical 
sense of shame over past historical experiences and memories (cf. Steele, 2008: 115). The 
institutionalized remembrance of the Holocaust in Europe serves as a prime example here for 
the centrality of this event in the political consciousness of contemporary West has dictated the 
tuning and hierarchical organization of the overall public remembrance of WWII, totalitarian 
crimes and modern mass death accordingly (Alexander, 2002). While the discursive framing of 
certain ways of public remembrance as ontological security problems emerges as an attempt to 
'right past wrongs', the juridification of ´ memory´ enables political actors to further their alleged 
ontological security needs with particular rigour and legal backing. The attempts to 
institutionalize politically and juridically a particular remembrance of the totalitarian 
communist regimes at a pan-European level, as pursued by Central and East European actors 
of various stripes especially after the eastern enlargement of the EU, provide ample support to 
																																								 																				
3 As Dmitri Rogozhin, a member of Russian State Duma suggested in April 2007, when Russian and Estonian 
remembrances about whether the Soviet annexation of the country in 1945 qualified as ´occupation´ or ´liberation´ 
from the Nazis clashed around the relocation of a Soviet war monument (the so-called ´ Bronze Soldier´) in Tallinn, 
such a move could have constituted a casus belli against Estonia (Delfi, 2007). 
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this claim. A number of post-communist countries in Eastern Europe have indeed called for the 
pan-European criminalization of the denial of crimes perpetrated by communist regimes in the 
same way a handful of the EU countries have banned the public condoning, denial, and gross 
trivialization of the Holocaust (Mälksoo, 2014). By seeking recognition for the inclusion of 
their experiences and assessment of communism into the established European mnemonical 
narrative and normative verdict of twentieth-century totalitarianisms, the East European actors 
concurrently seek recognition for their agency as Europeans (Mälksoo, 2009a). In turn, Russia´s 
State Duma´s passing of the memory law, criminalizing the public remembrance of certain 
aspects of WWII, targeted specifically against the ´dissemination of false information on the 
activities of the Soviet Union during WWII´ and the ´rehabilitation of Nazism and glorification 
of Nazi criminals and their accomplices´ is the most recent example of the kind (see Russkiy 
Mir, 2014; for discussion, see Koposov, 2014). The establishment of the Presidential 
Commission to Counter Attempts to Falsify History to the Detriment of Russia´s Interests in 
2009 in order to retaliate symbolic initiatives to establish an official equivalence between 
Stalinism and Nazism is yet another symptomatic case (even though the Commission has been 
dissolved by now). Both of these initiatives were arguably designed as a response to the multiple 
attempts to securitize ´national´ memories of WWII and communism in other East European 
countries,4 demonstrating thus the tendency of mnemonical securitization to produce circular 
security dilemmas. Altogether, the manifold initiatives to regulate the allowed remembrance of 
various totalitarian legacies by means of law, ranging from mere declaratory statements to 
concrete criminalizing measures, stipulating punishments for public condoning, denial, and 
																																								 																				
4	The Ukrainian parliament, for example, adopted a memory law in 2006, originally proposed by President Viktor 
Yuschenko, criminalizing the denial of the Great Famine or Holodomor (i.e. extermination by starvation) of 1932-
1933 and its genocidal nature. Ukraine further attempted (though eventually to no avail) to secure the adoption of 
a special resolution at the United Nations (UN) that would have declared Holodomor an act of genocide against 
the Ukrainian people. Likewise, Russia has sponsored resolutions in the UN opposing the alleged resurgence of 
Nazism since 2003. Several Central and Eastern European countries, including the Czech Republic, Poland, 
Hungary and Lithuania, have specific clauses in their national legislations regulating the legitimate remembrance 
of totalitarian communist regimes and the denial of their crimes.   
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'gross trivialization' of diverse international crimes, make competing, yet equally ontological 
claims on the security of ´memory´, or the legitimate public remembrance of the past.  
Ordering historical remembrance by means of law constitutes a legal way of closing off 
a particular notion of identity. As the long-baked Russian memory law on WWII5 demonstrates, 
mnemonical securitization is less about fast-tracking in the traditional sense of what amounts 
to extraordinary/emergency politics and more about ´placing limitations on otherwise 
inviolable rights´ (Buzan et al., 1998: 24), that is, subjecting the freedom of speech (along with 
academic freedom) as a core component of liberal democratic ´normal politics´ to restrictive 
juridico-political regulation. It is precisely in seeking to put something under political control 
that should otherwise be left in the realm of ordinary public deliberation, discussion and debate 
whereby memory laws qualify as extraordinary measures. As a means of sanctioning a 
legitimate relationship to the past by regulating certain remembrances as outside of the accepted 
boundaries of political bargaining, the laws criminalizing certain historical positions amount to 
institutionalized securitization, crystallizing thus ´the response and sense of urgency´ (Buzan et 
al., 1998: 27). These kind of ´laws of fear´are a crucial battleground in the politics of 
securitization (Williams, 2011: 459). The concrete securitizing potential of particular memory 
laws depends on their degree of stipulation of related punishments versus the declaratory nature 
of simply condemning a particular remembrance in moral terms.6 Russia´s recently adopted law 
on the legitimate frames of remembering WWII is a clear case of securitizing state-defined 
´national memory´ by outright criminalization of its contesters.7  
																																								 																				
5 Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that while multiple draft bills were discussed by the State Duma since 2009, the 
adoption of the final version of the law was notoriously fast in April 2014 against the backdrop of Russia´s 
intensifying military confrontation of Ukraine. 
6	Such as a number of recent political declarations by the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the EU, condemning totalitarian communist regimes in various ways 
(Mälksoo, 2014). 
7 The perpetrators of the crime of ´rehabilitating Nazism´ face a penalty to 300,000 rubles, forced hard labour or 
imprisonment for a period of up to three years. Further penalties are foreseen in the event of an abuse of public 
office or mass media. Fines are also introduced for desecrating Russian military glory dates or monuments. 
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While the discursive construction of historical memory as a security issue constitutes 
merely a securitizing move, whereby a particular historical remembrance is attempted to be 
framed as an issue that cannot be debated, a ´ memory law´ already amounts to a specific security 
practice, a concrete measure that firmly sets the limits to the allowed public remembrance of a 
particular historical event or legacy (cf. Salter and Mutlu, 2013: 816, fn. 4). It is precisely there 
whereby the securitization of memory features as fundamentally anti-political as it seeks to 
suppress or transcend the inherent antagonism of the political (see Mouffe, 2005a). The 
attempts to forge a mnemonic consensus at a national and transnational plane about as 
multidimensional historical issues as WWII, the legacy of various communist regimes in 
Central and Eastern Europe, or manifold politically motivated mass killings by pertinent 
memory laws seek to outdo this antagonism, yet ultimately end up confirming its 
ineradicability, for ´the political in its antagonistic dimension cannot be made to disappear by 
simply denying it or wishing it away´ (Mouffe, 2013: 3-4; Mouffe, 2005b). Seeking to protect 
a particular vision of the past by condemning, delegitimizing, or outright criminalizing the 
alternatives aims to secure a self by antagonizing others by the logic of survival. ´Memory 
imperatives´, such as the allegedly cosmopolitan memory of Holocaust (Levy and Sznaider, 
2002), especially in case they are buttressed with legislative means, endanger an open 
democratic debate over the past, for they tend to replace a healthy confrontation of democratic 
political positions by a fight between non-negotiable moral values or essentialist forms of 
identification (Mouffe, 2013: 7). In the context of the securitization of memory whereby 
particular visions of the past are presented as moral and the others as immoral, or evil, the other 
thus emerges as an enemy to be destroyed rather than a legitimate adversary ´ whose ideas might 
be fought, even fiercely, but whose right to defend those ideas is not to be questioned´ (Mouffe, 




nature (such as in case of the Holocaust remembrance in the EU) is not necessarily a more 
benign version of securitizing historical memory than the parochial nationalist variants (such 
as Russia´s above-quoted law seeking to protect its legal predecessor´s account of the WWII, 
criminalizing thus essentially the critical discussion of the Soviet conduct in WWII) for the 
consensual ideal, again, seeks to eradicate conflict from politics, yet paradoxically leading to 
apathy and to a disaffection with political participation instead (Mouffe, 2013: 7). 
For IR theory, the securitization of historical memory reaffirms the relevance of the 
enduring debate about the true nature of the process: namely, should the securitization of a 
socio-political issue be regarded as its hyperpoliticization or rather as depoliticization, as the 
issue is thus shifted outside of the realm of the so-called normal politics and into the hands of 
the technocratic discretionism of the democratically unaccountable security experts, away from 
the eye and participation of the public (Edkins, 1999)? After all, securitizing ways of 
remembering and relating to the past on the justification of their importance for actor's identity 
implicitly tries to close mnemonical conflicts off politics. Yet, this approach hardly makes these 
conflicts simply disappear as they keep looming on at the social level.8 The securitization of 
'national memory' highlights the tendency to disregard and close off the intrasocietal tensions, 
contestations, debates, and power struggles. Buttressing a national mythscape (under a banner 
of protecting 'our' memory and 'our' identity) makes it imperative to disregard the possibility of 
an international and intrasocietal dialogue, making the initially rather metaphorically labelled 
'memory wars' eventually self-fulfilling prophecies. 
The relationship between securitization and politicization is fraught with complexity, 
however. On the one hand, securitization is rendered in the original Copenhagen School´s 
																																								 																				
8	As was vividly demonstrated in the context of the so-called Bronze Soldier crisis in Estonia in April 2007 when 
the legal backing for the relocation of a Soviet-era WWII monument from Tallinn city centre to a military cemetery 
could not curb violent upheavals of the Russian-speaking youth, fiercely disapproving of the move (Mälksoo, 
2009b). 
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account as ´fram[ing] the issue as a special kind of politics or as above politics´; ´as a more 
extreme version of politicization´ (Buzan et al., 1998: 23). In another sense, securitization is 
opposed to politicization as the latter ´means to make an issue appear to be open, a matter of 
choice, something that is decided upon and that therefore entails responsibility, in contrast to 
issues that….should not be put under political control´ (Buzan et al., 1998: 29). The tenuous 
distinction between the notions of securitization and politicization reflects a tense combination 
of a decisionist and exclusionary notion of security, drawing inspiration from a Schmittian 
understanding of the political, and the Arendtian understanding of politics as the embodiment 
of the publicly debatable in the Copenhagen School´s nodes of extraordinary/emergency and 
´normal´ politics, respectively (cf. Aradau, 2004: 393). This tension is hardly helped by what is 
allegedly a missing ´concept of politics or clear definition of politicization´ in the Copenhagen 
School´s securitization theory (Aradau, 2004: 389; cf. Wæver, 2011). A harsh dichotomy 
between politics and security is certainly one of the most problematic premises of the 
securitization framework (McDonald, 2008, 2011), not least for this distinction may be wholly 
unfamiliar to those outside liberal democratic states, thus questioning the assumption of an 
inherent, universal logic and dynamics of security regardless of the physical context (Browning 
and McDonald, 2011). Moreover, the positioning of ´ normal politics´ and security in opposition 
to each other remains oblivious of the extent liberalism (as the ideological frame of ´normal 
politics´) has been predicated on ´security´ instead of the commonly held assumption of 
´liberty´ (Neocleous, 2007).  
Problematizing the dichotomous supposition of the distinguishability between ´politics´ 
and ´security´, I take security to be inherently political as it is constituting, reproducing and 
sustaining power relations. The conceptualization of politics adopted here accepts politics as 
intrinsically unstable, always in the making – thus first and foremost understanding it as an 
activity, establishing meaning and identity, rather than a sphere (i.e. the location of political 
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institutions) (cf. the first conversation on politics in the securitization literature, Pram Gad and 
Lund Petersen, 2011: 318). Securitizing attempts to stop politics and contestations of multiple 
mnemonic narratives are therefore fundamentally depoliticizing as well as ultimately futile. 
Meanwhile, as politics could be regarded – in the Foucaultian hyperbolic reading at least – as 
the continuation of war by other means (see Foucault, 2003), analytically sensible distinction 
between the workings and logic of politics and security remains difficult to make. I concur with 
Michael C. Williams (2011: 459) on regarding the sphere of ´normal politics´ and the sphere of 
security as a continuum rather than a sharp distinction. This article takes the respective 
emphases on debate and deliberation versus silence and speed (see Roe, 2012: 252) as the most 
significant line of distinction between politicization and securitization. Yet, while politicization 
in the Copenhagen School´s understanding should indicate to paying attention to due process 
through the parliamentary proceedings, maintaining a space for debate and disagreement for all 
parties involved, parliamentary hearings and due process are no guarantee of sustaining ´ normal 
politics´ as they could become instruments of securitization for the tendency of the 
norm/exception binary to become blurred in legislative security politics over time (Neal, 2012: 
261). Moreover, as Matt McDonald (2011) has shown in the context of the public debate on 
asylum-seekers in Australia, some forms of political debate may actually render securitization 
more likely, thus questioning the strong analytical distinction between the realms of ‘security’ 
and ‘politics’ in the securitization framework and calling for a further normative explanation of 
the desirability of various forms of deliberation and debate. Against that backdrop, the idea that 
securitization needs a process of desecuritization to recover the political, as promoted by the 
Copenhagen School, is too tidy and linear, depicting security strictly as a failure of ´normal 
politics´, thereby failing to see it as among ´most powerful of political categories´ - as a site of 
perpetual contestation and possible emancipatory change (McDonald, 2008: 579).  
	 18	
Contextualizing the discussion of the possibilities to dismantle the mnemonical 
constituent of ontological security in the desecuritization/repoliticization debate with the above 
qualifications in mind, I contend that public historical remembrance of the past naturally needs 
to be politically discussed, but preferably not juridified (which is, in and of itself, a form of 
depoliticization, the act of shifting public remembrance out of the realm of an open and non-
repressive political debate between various actors, state and non-state alike). Yet, the discourse 
of mnemonical security enables such a shift, as it normalizes the need for an existential 
buttressing of a state-defined self-narrative. We should therefore be extremely cautious about 
the alleged 'ontological security needs' of the states for this notion is hardly an innocent 
description of the identity-memory-security nexus. Rather, the argument pursued here takes its 
cue from Wæver (1995: 56) who claims that ´transcending a security problem by politicizing it 
cannot happen through thematization in security terms, only away from such terms´. What 
could then be the larger counter-narrative to the concept of 'we seek to be secure in what we 
remember (that is, choose to remember) about our past'? In other words, what could be an 
effective counter-narrative to mnemonical security? 
 
Desecuritization as Repoliticization 
It might be desirable to disintegrate the automatized connection between the state-supervised 
public remembrance of the key historic events of a political community and its so-called 
ontological security. I argue for the desecuritization of memory, in order to escape the tendency 
of mnemonical securitization to actually depoliticize deeply political issues and public 
concerns. The conceptual debate over securitization amounting to depoliticization or rather to 
hyperpoliticization is as old as the notion of securitization itself (Hansen, 2012). I understand 
the process of mnemonical securitization firmly in the former meaning for there is hardly 
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'anything more political in social life than the struggle over identity' (Steele, 2008: 5). 
Therefore, contra the calls to depoliticize memory (e.g., Miller, 2010), this article puts forth a 
call for the positively invigorated repoliticization of issues of social remembrance on the 
assumption of a careful definition of what is really meant by the (benign) politics of memory. 
Claudia Aradau (2004: 388) has shrewdly pointed out that questions about desecuritization raise 
fundamental ‘questions about what kinds of politics we want’. Taking a cue from her, the rest 
of the paper ponders on the kinds of memory politics that would be preferable to the 
securitization claims laid on practices of public remembrance.  
Both securitization and desecuritization involve the configurations (and possibly 
reconfigurations) of self/other relations. It is important to notice, however, that even though 
ontological security presupposes an other (since its intimate connection with identity requires 
differentiation), it does not necessarily lead to the securitization of an other in the sense of 
defining it as a threat (Rumelili, 2013) – just like being critical of the Soviet conduct in WWII 
need not, by definition, signify the attempted ´rehabilitation of Nazism´, as the zero-sum 
mnemonic vision crystallized in the recently adopted Russian memory law on WWII seemingly 
assumes. Accordingly, self/other relations could be reconfigured so that the perceptions of 
threat would be removed without discarding the distinctions necessary for ´security-as-being´. 
Nonetheless, even in case of desecuritization, the emerging self/other relations would still be 
infused with power, and the possibility of constructing the other as inferior, or distant, cannot 
be entirely ruled out (Rumelili, 2013). The 'ethos of survival' permeating security, be it physical 
or ontological, still tends to impose 'a particular kind of a relational mode, whose focus is the 
protection of the self and the surviving of the other' (Odysseos, 2002: 414). The ethical 
imperative of self-preservation thus still remains the essence of security. 
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The politics beyond mnemonical security therefore necessitates to move beyond a 
secure self, to unravel the subject of security through the sense of the other (Calkivik, 2010: 
138). In order to begin imagining the politics of memory beyond the politics of mnemonical 
security, the radical interdependency of the self and an other should be recognized first. In IR, 
this suggestion has been promoted by scholars working in the vein of Heidegger, Levinas, and 
Nancy, generally underscoring the relational co-existence and ´critical belonging´ contra the 
assumption of the possibility of absolute subjectivity, or organic community (e.g., Coward, 
2005; Odysseos, 2007; Dillon, 1996). Besides re-configuring self/other relations by 
thoughtfulness about and responsibility for the effects of our actions on the needs of others (cf. 
Steele, 2008: 164), it might be necessary, at times, to break free from the habitual routines of 
self-definition, to be open to reconceptualize oneself in the interests of a healthier ontological 
and physical self/other relationship, to be more willing to embrace self-reflexivity, to learn, and 
possibly change. 
Taking our cue from Brent Steele's (2008) biographical, narrative-centric approach to 
ontological security, there is always room for self-reflexive learning and some constructive 
change in the self-narratives we produce about ourselves. Accordingly, moving beyond the 
politics of mnemonical security as a sub-layer of ontological security would entail the ability of 
political actors to learn to tell new stories about themselves, to break away from the old and 
possibly harmful routines for both themselves and their 'others'; in a nutshell, their ability to 
renew oneself, not just survive as a certain sort of being. Advancing self-interrogative reflexive 
processes as part of the healthy politics of memory thus becomes crucial for moving beyond the 
politics of mnemonical security (cf. Steele, 2008: 149). Instead of the public sanctification and 
securitization of the remembrance of the ´Great Patriotic War´ as the core of modern Russia´s 
self-narrative and thereby a major source of its ontological security as a powerful and heroic 
state, the country´s historical self-reflection would benefit from the ´memory work´ of the likes 
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of Memorial – a social movement dating back to the times of perestroika, with a pursuit to 
preserve the social memory of Soviet political repressions, and a human rights organization 
focussing on the perspective of individual sufferings and injustices done by, rather than the 
glory of, the state, Conjoining historians and legal advocates, Memorial´s mnemopolitics 
comprises of the study, commemoration and education on the political persecution and the 
violation of human rights on the territory of the former Soviet Union both in historical and 
contemporary perspective. As a counterpoint to Russia´s state-sanctioned selective 
remembrance of WWII and the overall Soviet experiment (of which the registration of 
Memorial´s Moscow Center as a ´foreign agent´ by the Ministry of Justice speaks volumes), the 
focal point of Memorial´s legal mnemopolitics has been the amendment of the Law on 
Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repression (1991) and legal assistance to the victims of 
the Soviet repressions. Its self-appointed mission remains ´to promote mature civil society and 
democracy based on the rule of law…to prevent a return to totalitarianism´.9  
Of course, questioning oneself is often viewed as a signal of weakness by both internal 
critics and external adversaries – which is perhaps the reason why self-interrogation tends to be 
suspended more often than not in the mnemonical practices of states. It is indeed the 'irony of 
self-interrogative reflexivity...that it may disturb before it heals (Steele, 2008: 151). It is hardly 
surprising, then, that a common trait in the politics of memory of post-war Western and post-
communist Eastern European countries alike has been the tendency to recall the immediate 
collective tragedies first through the prism of national martyrdom or victimhood before turning 
a more critical eye to the issues of co-responsibility, collaboration, and possibly also guilt. 
Russia´s recently adopted memory law which attempts to curb any discussion of the Soviet-
																																								 																				
9	See http://www.memo.ru/eng/about/charter.htm (accessed: 29 July 2014).  
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Nazi early wartime alliance and reject the notion of ´Soviet war crimes´ is a symptomatic 
example of this pattern. 
Openness to question the rigid vision of one's past and willingness to adopt 
heterogeneous stories instead of the grand mnemonical narrative of the whole nation, or state 
might surely dismantle the well-established and emotionally satisfying routines of the actors 
concerned, but eventually end up bringing them closer to the desired sense of ontological peace 
(or the state of mnemonical asecurity) where issues of remembrance are not even considered in 
security terms anymore. Change in the habitual patterns of the politics of mnemonical security 
cannot therefore happen without reflection on one's habits (cf. Hopf, 2010: 555). 
The process of self-reflection and possible transformation is linked to the process of 
transforming images of the other whereby the latter comes to perceive the key aspects of their 
identity to be recognized (Strömbom, 2014). The recognition of the other´s difference implies 
a mutually accepted agreement to disagree on the ´national´ interpretations of historical events 
and issues rather than an achievement of a single joint narrative on the past (see Raag, 2013, for 
a recent example in that direction). 
 
Conclusion: towards Agonistic Mnemopolitics 
I have thusfar tried to accomplish two tasks in this paper. First, the concept of mnemonical 
security as a subset of a rapidly expanding research programme on ontological security was 
developed. Next, this notion was dissected for its tendency to beat the purpose of achieving a 
sense of consummation for a collective self in international relations as well as its problematic 
ethical ramifications. Since competitive consolidation attempts of social memory tend to 
reproduce rather than eliminate the sense of insecurity among the contesters, I outlined two 
moves necessary to move out of the politics of security (cf. Dillon, 1996): (i) the 
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desecuritization of memory in order to allow for its repoliticization, and (ii) the rethinking of 
the self/other relationship.  
In this final section, an alternative political imaginary is sketched to that of mnemonical 
securitization by putting forth an argument for the politics of agonistic mnemonic pluralism 
instead of the futile search for a mnemonical consensus. In lieu of the exponential growth in 
securitization of the conflicting views of the past and the attempts to solve this tension by 
outlawing certain ways of remembrance at national and regional levels, a radically democratic, 
agonistic memory politics would be in order for that would cease from the knee-jerk treatment 
of the issues of identity, memory and history as problems of security. The selective censorship 
of social remembrance precludes the actors from justifying and rationalizing their actions (cf. 
Owens, 2007: 5), depriving thus the process of ontological security seeking from its true 
political contents. Agonistic pluralism in the politics of memory presumes the vitality of the 
struggle over interpretations of the commonly experienced past in order to advance a better 
understanding of the self and clarify the mnemonical component of a self/other nexus. As for 
agonistic politics in general, the sort of memory politics advised here presumes the 
impossibility of ever outlawing conflict, disagreement, and discord from political action (cf. 
Arendt as cited in Owens, 2007: 25-26). Assuming that certain differences and the 
contestability of social remembrance remain irreducible, the public relationship towards the 
past has to remain in the realm of speakable, debatable, and discussable – that is, it should be 
allowed to live in the sphere of the political, or the realm of speech, as Hannah Arendt put it 
(cited in Owens, 2007: 5). In the long run, this would amount to a step towards a political order 
in which the moves seeking to securitize ´memory´ are less likely to succeed (see Tjalve, 2011: 
442).  
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Instead of seeking the mnemonic consensus as an expression of the idealized mnemonic 
security, agonistic memory pluralism emphasizes the opportunity to identify with clearly 
distinguished opinions and positions in the public sphere on the assumption that the political 
model oriented towards consolidating a consensual common vision offers no choice, no 
meaningful alternatives (Mouffe, 2013). While Mouffe´s concern is democratic politics at the 
domestic level, her model´s core warning ´of the illusion that a fully achieved democracy could 
ever be instantiated´ (Mouffe, 1999: 757) is evocative in the context of mnemonical security-
seeking, enabling the extension of the argument for agonistic pluralism to discuss states´ 
interaction with each other as well. It thus necessitates a move beyond the politics of mnemonic 
security and towards agonistic pluralism in collective remembrance, that is, towards the politics 
of memory between plural equals. Such a mnemopolitical engagement is presumed, however, 
on the readiness of the contenders to concede to the idea of the mutual dependence and ultimate 
unfinalizability of their identities. The expeditious adoption of the model of agonistic 
mnemopolitics remains rather far-fetched in Eastern Europe against the backdrop of 
considerable power imbalances between Russia and its former Soviet dependants and the 
former´s state-endorsed mnemopolitics determining the identity of the state (and its ability for 
agency thereof) in zero-sum terms.  
 
The suggestion to stand clear from regulating public remembrance of historical events 
by means of law, avoiding outright criminalizing bans on historical interpretations in particular, 
might easily be read as a call for a First Amendment for Europe, something akin to the 
eponymous stipulation of the US Bill of Rights which protects free speech broadly. Yet, a 
failure to acknowledge the accompanying legal debate over regulating so-called hate speech 
	 25	
would be equally ignorant. As Browning and McDonald (2013: 250) have perceptively pointed 
out: 
The normative preference for deliberation evident in the commitment to desecuritization…is not suf-
ficiently robust to enable us to engage with difficult questions concerning the forms of deliberation that 
should be encouraged or even the circumstances in which ‘hate speech’…might be curtailed. 
 
Evidently, guaranteeing free speech along with regulating to prevent the harms of hate 
speech present competing policy demands (Gelber, 2010). It is not surprising then that hate 
speech and historical revisionism/negation have often become convoluted in European 
legislations and legal practice. While this discussion is out of the scope of this article, it remains 
the case that in a situation where several European jurisdictions as well as the case law by the 
European Court of Human Rights have established the criminalization of Holocaust denial or 
defence as an important exception to the freedom to debate the past, or the justifiable 
restrictions on free speech (Brems, 2011:7), competitive quests on applying the same delimiting 
standards on remembering other cases of genocide or crimes against humanity (e.g., the crimes 
of the totalitarian communist regimes), or simply on cases of ´ ontological security significance´ 
(such as the remembrance of WWII as defined by the current Russian regime) are bound to pop 
up with potentially detrimental consequences to transitional justice in the countries under 
question, as well as academic freedom and freedom of speech in general.   
The argument presented here has called for more politics of memory instead of the 
widespread attempts to fix the public relationship to the past by juridified rules as a tactic to 
buttress competitive 'selves'. In the Arendtian spirit, the importance of a genuine debate 
between plural equals (see Owens, 2007: 25-6; cf. Arendt, 1958) should be recognized, and the 
right for the open struggle over memory instead of vain attempts to secure one's own 'national 
memory' at the expense of the other(s)' only encouraged. Reconceptualizing a self/other 
relationship from that of enemies to ideological and mnemonical opponents, or adversaries, 
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creates a symbolic space necessary for arguing over the diverging interpretations and positions 
on the commonly experienced, yet contested, past. Such a move advances both self-reflexivity 
and that between a self and an other. If the other in the debates over collective remembrance 
becomes conceptualized as someone whose vision of the past we might not agree with but 
whose right to defend that vision we do not put into question as such, a more benevolent 
perspective for settling these mnemonic debates is created than in a situation where the securing 
of a memory is regarded as necessitating the destruction of another (cf. Mouffe, 1999).  
Agonistic mnemonic pluralism, informed by critical historical research, should alleviate 
understanding about – although not necessarily the mutual acceptance of – different readings 
of the commonly experienced past. From the ontological security perspective, the reflexivity 
about oneself is a surer step in the direction of achieving a sense of self-consummation and 
accomplishment than uncritical attempts at consolidating a single authoritative vision of the 
past for a political collective. Letting the hope of achieving the security of memory go would 
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